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Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When
asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and
spatiality may lead to the evolution of fairness, thus far considered continuous strategies have precluded the
observation of solutions that would be driven by pattern formation. Here we introduce a spatial ultimatum game
with discrete strategies, and we show that this simple alteration opens the gate to fascinatingly rich dynamical
behavior. Besides mixed stationary states, we report the occurrence of traveling waves and cyclic dominance,
where one strategy in the cycle can be an alliance of two strategies. The highly webbed phase diagram, entailing
continuous and discontinuous phase transitions, reveals hidden complexity in the pursuit of human fair play.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 87.23.Kg, 89.75.Fb
Imagine two players having to share a sum of money. One
proposes a split, and the other can either agree with it or not.
No haggling is allowed. If there is an agreement, the sum is
shared according to the proposal. If not, both players remain
empty handed. This is the blueprint of the ultimatum game,
as proposed by Gu¨th et al. [1]. Therein, a rational proposer
should always claim the large majority of the sum, given that
the responder ought to accept even the smallest amount of-
fered. Experiments, however, reveal a different reality; one
where the selfish and fully rational Homo economicus fre-
quently gives way to the emotional Homo emoticus [2]. In
fact, largely regardless of sex, age and the amount of money
at stake, people refuse to accept offers they perceive as too
small [3, 4]. More precisely, offers below one third of the to-
tal amount are rejected as often as they are accepted, and not
surprisingly, more than two thirds of all offers will be remark-
ably close to the fair 50:50 split.
While explanations for the human fondness of fair division
range from the psychologically-inspired definitions of utility
functions [5] to the failure of “seizing the moment” (imply-
ing that after the game there will be no further interactions
between the two players) [6], theoretical studies indicate that
empathy [7, 8], spatial structure [9–11], heterogeneity [12],
and reputation [13] play a pivotal role. In particular, Page et
al. [9] have shown that in well-mixed populations natural se-
lection favors the rational solution, while spatiality may lead
to much fairer outcomes. This result has been tested thor-
oughly against different types of players and updating rules
[11], on various interaction networks [14–18], as well as un-
der coevolution [19]. Although there is no doubt that spatial
structure promotes the evolution of fairness, it is interesting
that even in a non-spatial setting fair play may evolve if the
population is small [20] or if players are empathetic, i.e. if
their offer p matches the acceptance level q [7].
Apart from occasionally studied minigame versions of the
ultimatum game [13], which consider only a few representa-
tive strategies and are traditionally employed to demonstrate
principles of general importance, previous works focused on
the full continuum of strategies as given by p, q ∈ [0, 1] (with-
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FIG. 1: Schematic presentation of five discrete empathetic strategies
Ei (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) with the possible values of p = q spread across
the unit interval. The additional strategy A is characterized by an
arbitrary (p, q) pair. While in the absence of A players adopting the
fair E2 strategy are the undisputed victors, the outcome changes dra-
matically when the A strategy is present, and it depends intricately
on the (p, q) pair that characterizes it.
out loss of generality assuming that the sum to be divided
equals one). Here we depart from this concept by proposing
a spatial ultimatum game with discrete strategies in order to
reveal solutions that are driven by pattern formation. Unlike
minigames, which typically feature a small number of care-
fully chosen strategies, we still consider the whole unit inter-
val of p and q. But instead of the infinite number of contin-
uous strategies, we introduce N discrete strategies Ei where
i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, as schematically depicted in Fig. 1 for
N = 5. We consider Ei to be empathetic players and thus
characterized by p = q, yet contested by an additional strat-
egy A that is characterized by an arbitrary (p, q) pair. Initially,
we thus have N + 1 strategies that are distributed at random
with equal probability on a L2 square lattice, whereby each
player x is assigned a (p, q) pair, corresponding to its offering
and acceptance level. For players adopting strategy A we will
consider the fixed p and q values as the two main parameters
determining the evolutionary outcome of the game, while a
player x adopting one of the Ei (i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1) empa-
thetic strategies has px = qx = (r + i)/N where the random
real number r ∈ [0, 1) is drawn for the creation of the strat-
2egy (either in the initial state or during the strategy adoption
process).
The evolution of the initial strategy distribution is per-
formed by repeating the following elementary steps in accor-
dance with the Monte Carlo simulation procedure. First, a
randomly selected player x acquires its payoff Ux by playing
the ultimatum game with its four nearest neighbors, whereby
in each pairwise interaction acting once as proposer with px
and once as a responder with qx. Next, a randomly chosen
neighbor, denoted by y, also acquires its payoffUy in the same
way. Lastly, player x tries to enforce its strategy on player
y in accordance with the probability w = {1 + exp[(Uy −
Ux)/K]}
−1
, where K quantifies the amplitude of noise [21].
Without loosing generality, we set K = 0.1, making it very
likely that better performing players will pass their strategy
onto their neighbors, yet it is also possible that players will
occasionally learn from those performing worse.
We emphasize that during the imitation of an empathetic
strategy Ei (i = 0, . . . , N − 1) a new random number r is
generated for the corresponding value of py = qy in order to
take into account the role of mutation, which was also consid-
ered in the continuous ultimatum game [13]. The possibility
of slight modifications of the (p, q) values corresponding to
a given strategy reduces the sensitivity to initial conditions.
Conversely, for the adoption of the strategy A the inherited
(p, q) pair remains unchanged. This allows us to study the
evolutionary response of the empathetic population to an at-
tack of a given strategy A.
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FIG. 2: Phase diagram for N = 5 in the presence of strategy A char-
acterized by the parameters p and q. Solid red and dashed blue lines
denote continuous and discontinuous phase transitions, respectively.
Besides several single and two-strategy phases, a rich array of three-
strategy phases, in part governed by intricate cyclic dominance, can
be observed. Further details are given in the main text.
For the evolutionary process the time is measured in Monte
Carlo steps (MCS). During one MCS each player has a chance
once on average to modify its strategy. For the systematic nu-
merical analysis we have determined the fraction of strategies
in the final stationary state when varying the values of p and
q. For the evaluation of the phase diagram with an adequate
accuracy (see Fig. 2), we have used appropriate system sizes,
varied from L = 400 to 6000, by applying periodic boundary
condition. Thermalization and sampling times changed from
ts, tth = 10
4 to 106 MCS and small variations in the values
of p and q are used in the vicinity of phase transitions.
Before presenting the main results, we briefly survey the
outcome of the game under well-mixed conditions. In the ab-
sence of strategy A, the fair E2 strategy prevails over other
empathetic strategies [17]. The E2 strategy can also dominate
strategy A(p, q), but only if q < 0.5 or p > 0.5. For p < 0.5
and q > 0.5 E2 and A are neutrally stable and subject to ran-
dom drift, thus always resulting in a fixation if the population
is finite.
Figure 2 shows the qualitatively distinguishable phases in
the final stationary state as a function of p and q. If q > p
or p > 0.82 strategy A dies out and the system evolves into
a homogeneous state where only the fair E2 strategy remains
alive, that is the system reproduces the well-known result re-
ported in previous works [7, 8], confirming that empathy may
lead to the evolution of fairness. Within the complemen-
tary triangle, however, there is an intricately webbed region
where much more complex outcomes are possible. Besides
the single (A, E0, E1) and two-strategy [(E0 +A), (E1 +A),
(E2 + A), (E3 + A)] phases, we can observe different three-
strategy phases, where the three strategies are caught up in
cyclic dominance [(E0 + E1 + A), (E2 + E3 + A)], or even
where one strategy in the cycle is an alliance of two strategies
[E1 +(E2 +A) +E2]. It is emphasized that below the p = q
line within the complementary triangle players A invade the
whole system if the non-empathetic driving force (p − q) is
weaker than a threshold value dependent on p.
A highlight is also the survivability of strategy E3, which
falsifies the assumption that “superfair” behavior, when a
player offers more than it keeps, is unsustainable. In ad-
dition, the fully rational E0 strategy remains alive in three
phases (denoted E0, E0 + A and E0 + E1 + A), as marked
in the corresponding regions of the phase diagram. Apart
from this, the intermediate strategy E1 can also dominate the
other strategies or coexist with them, either in two- or three-
strategy phases. Notice that within the webbed triangle, the
fair E2 strategy can never dominate, and it occurs only in
rather small-sized regions. From this observation one can con-
clude that the evolution of fairness by means of empathy is
rather vulnerable in the presence of a strategy that is not lim-
ited by the p = q condition (in our case strategy A). Yet the
vulnerability of fairness doesn’t stem so much from a direct
threat, in the sense that strategy A would be directly supe-
rior to strategy E2, but rather from the fact that it elevates the
survivability of the other strategies. A direct consequence is
a high spatiotemporal complexity of solutions, ranging from
simple two-strategy alliances to cyclic dominance between
three strategies, as well as cyclic dominance between two
strategies and a two-strategy alliance [E1 + (E2 +A) +E2].
The strategy fractions do not define clearly all the relevant
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FIG. 3: Characteristic spatial patterns emerging for different combi-
nations of p and q: (a) p = 0.02 and q = 0; (b) p = 0.4 and q = 0;
(c) p = 0.81 and q = 0.536. In all panels the system size is L = 240
and the strategy colors are those introduced in Fig. 1.
features of the final stationary states, as it is demonstrated by
the three snapshots presented in Fig. 3. Panel (a) of Fig. 3
shows a characteristic snapshot of a self-organizing pattern
with traveling invasion fronts and rotating spirals that is re-
lated to the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance [23]
between the three strategies (E1 → E0 → A → E1) at
p = 0.02 and q = 0. The coexistence of the same three strate-
gies is maintained by a fundamentally different mechanism
yielding a pattern illustrated in the panel (b) where p = 0.4
and q = 0. The latter strategy distribution can be interpreted
as a poly-domain structure of the E0 +A and E1 +A phases
resembling the phase segregation of a water-oil mixture in the
presence of a surfactant [22]. The latter analogy is supported
by the continuous variation (from 0 to 1) in the ratio of the
territory of E0 +A and E1 +A phases.
The snapshot (c) in Fig. 3 illustrates another three-strategy
state, where strategy A (black) with p = 0.81 and q = 0.536
enables the survival of the “superfair” E3 strategy (orange),
which on the other hand is inferior to E2 (green). The plotted
strategy distribution is formed after a long transient process.
Namely, within a short time the random strategy distribution
evolves into a state dominated by E2 with small growing is-
lands of A strategies. In a small portion of growing A islands
several E3 strategies remain alive and their offspring spread
away in the whole system when the condition of percolation
is satisfied.
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FIG. 4: Evolution of the strategy distribution for the exotic E1 +
(E2+A)+E2 phase occurring at (p, q) = (0.645, 0). The snapshots
were taken at times (a) t = 1000,(b) 1100 and (c) 1200 MCS for
L = 240. The colors of strategies are those introduced in Fig. 1.
The time evolution of another remarkable self-organizing
pattern is illustrated by three consecutive snapshots in Fig. 4,
which correspond to the stationary state. Due to the cyclic
dominance (E1 → (E2 + A) → E2 → E1) emerging for
the given (p, q) pair, the islands of E2 players are growing in
the sea of E1 players. The growth is blocked once these is-
lands become infected by A, which yields the appearance of
the E2 + A phase, which in turn can be invaded by E1. In
some cases, however, several E2 players survive by forming
a sufficiently large nucleon, which closes the loop of cyclic
dominance. We note again that in this case the loop of dom-
inance is not formed by three strategies, as for example by
the E0 + E1 + A phase [see Fig. 3(a)], but rather it consists
of two strategies (E1 and E2) and an alliance of two strate-
gies (E2 +A). Although similarly complex phases have been
reported before in spatial ecological models [24] and most re-
cently for the spatial public goods game with pool punish-
ment [25], the current observation enforces that such exotic
solutions may be significantly more common than initially as-
sumed, especially in systems describing human behavior.
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FIG. 5: Representative cross-sections of the phase diagram depicted
in Fig. 2 [panels (a-e)], along with the evolution of the order pa-
rameter fE1 (the fraction of strategy E1) for different values of q
[panel (f)]. The symbols indicate results for the strategy fractions as
a function of p (or q) for fixed q (or p) values, as indicated in the
corresponding panels.
Finally, we examine quantitatively the properties of phase
transitions depicted in Fig. 2, which delineate all the differ-
ent phases that we have graphically described in Figs. 3 and
4. Figure 5(a) shows consecutive continuous phase transitions
leading from the pure A phase, over the two-strategy E0 + A
4and the three-strategy E0+E1 +A phase, to the two-strategy
E1 +A phase when p is increased for q = 0.1. As mentioned
above, the three-strategyE2+E3+A phase can be considered
as the poly-domain combination of the E0+A and the E1+A
phase. Qualitatively similar continuous phase transitions can
be observed for larger p values (if q = 0.1), as illustrated in
Fig. 5(b). The two-strategy E2 + A and E3 + A phases are
separated by the three-strategy E2 + E2 + A phase via con-
tinuous transitions if q is increased for p = 0.77, as shown
in Fig. 5(c). On the contrary, Fig. 5(d) represents a discontin-
uous phase transition from E1 + A to E2 + A. Even more
interestingly, the transition line separating the pure E1 phase
and the exotic E1 + (E2 +A) +E2 phase changes from con-
tinuous to discontinuous via a tricritical point at p = 0.6483
and q = 0.27. For higher q values the transition is continuous
as illustrated in Figure 5(e). By decreasing q, however, the
transition becomes discontinuous and the jump in the order
parameter fE1 grows gradually as shown in Fig. 5(f).
In summary, we have proposed and studied a spatial ultima-
tum game with a discrete set of strategies for a dynamics based
on stochastic imitation of a neighboring strategy. The strat-
egy set included N empathetic strategies and an additional A
strategy characterized by fixed proposal (p) and acceptance
(q) values. We would like to emphasize that discreteness of
possible parameters characterizing empathetic strategies is a
natural assumption since human bargain is indeed practically
conducted in this way. Our numerical analysis was performed
for N = 5 at a low noise level in order to study the reac-
tion of the empathetic players to the presence of strategy A
on the structured population. All the main findings, however,
summarized by the phase diagram in Fig. 2, are robust and
remain valid also for larger N . Naturally, more empathetic
strategies offer more coexistence possibilities with the strat-
egy A below the q = p diagonal. We have also tested and
confirmed the emergence of alliances for the so-called death-
birth strategy updating, where a player is chosen randomly to
die and the neighbors compete for the empty site proportional
to their payoffs [26]. This modification too does not alter the
possible solutions, and indeed results in a very similar phase
diagram. We have thus shown that the previously reported
evolution of fairness by means of empathy and spatiality is
feasible in the absence of strategy A, even for the discrete set
of strategies used. Furthermore, we have shown that the in-
troduction of the additional strategy A does not influence the
final stationary state for sufficiently large values of p or q > p
because players adopting strategy A become extinct within a
short transient time, and finally the fair players come to dom-
inate the system. On the contrary, below the p = q line on the
p − q plane players A can survive, either alone or by form-
ing complex alliances with the empathetic strategies. Besides
the mentioned homogeneous states, we have observed several
types of strategy coexistence that were maintained by differ-
ent mechanisms, primarily routed in the formation of intricate
patterns on the spatial grid. Each type of these solutions repre-
sents a particular way by means of which a portion of the em-
pathetic players can survive in the presence of non-empathetic
behavior. In some cases a non-empathetic strategy can stabi-
lize rational strategies that would be employed by Homo eco-
nomicus, as well as completely irrational strategies that could
be adopted by an extremely generous Homo emoticus. At the
same time, the wide variety of solutions highlights the sensi-
tivity of the system to the parameters of the strategy A. The
present model supports the spontaneous emergence of strategy
associations (composed from a subset of strategies with a spe-
cific spatiotemporal structure), which play a fundamental role
in many human and biological systems, and as demonstrated
in this Letter, can be studied in the theoretical framework of
evolutionary games with methods of statistical physics.
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